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Introduction 
 
 Juvenile delinquency is a particularly important issue because juveniles make up 
the next generation in both positive and negative respects; in a negative respect, juvenile 
offenders today can potentially become the next generation of adult criminals if the 
current juvenile justice system fails to divert their delinquent behavior.  In a positive 
respect, juveniles make up the next generation of contributing members of society. 
Therefore, effective juvenile delinquency intervention is important in preventing 
juveniles from further developing permanent criminal behavior, and instead assisting 
them to become responsible and effective contributing adults that make socially 
acceptable decisions. 
 The first juvenile courts were established by the Illinois legislature in 1899, 
initially adopting the principle of parens patriae, which recognizes that “the State as 
parent” has the authority and responsibility for intervening on the child’s behalf when a 
child’s biological parents failed to provide adequate care and supervision.1  By creating a 
separate juvenile court from the adult court, legislators recognized that juvenile offenders 
were different from adult offenders and thus should be treated differently and held to 
different standards in determining guilt and punishment.  More importantly, early 
juvenile courts believed that juvenile delinquency could be cured using a completely 
individualized approach that only considers the individual offender and his/her needs 
rather than looking at the committed offense.  Consequently, this rehabilitative approach 
resulted in a considerable amount of unequal treatment and unproportionality because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Lisette Blumhardt, In the Best Interest of the Child: Juvenile Justice or Adult Retribution, 23 Hawaii L. 
Rev. 341, 343 (2000). 
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juvenile court judges mainly considered factors pertaining to the individual offender 
rather than the severity of his/her offense.  As a result, a poor black male from a single-
parent household may receive harsher punishment for committing burglary than a 
middle-class white male from a stable home that commits the same offense because the 
black male would be deemed more at risk and in need of juvenile court intervention. 
 Then the 1980s and 1990s saw a significant increase in juvenile arrest rates and 
juvenile violent crime rates thereby creating increased concern from the general public.  
As a result, the public began to believe that the current juvenile justice system was too 
lenient on juveniles, and state legislators were prompted to implement stricter juvenile 
justice laws that created harsher penalties for serious crimes committed by juveniles.  
Legislators responded to the public’s outcry for harsher penalties by broadening the 
offenses and lowering the age at which a juvenile can be transferred to adult criminal 
court and tried as an adult.  Additionally, juveniles were given harsher penalties for their 
criminal behavior that mirrored adult sentencing.  Juvenile transfer was intended to hold 
juveniles accountable for their serious and violent crimes and to deter potential future 
offenders from committing similar crimes.  Juveniles that were transferred and convicted 
in criminal court were held to the same standards as adult offenders and were also 
subjected to the same penalties, including capital punishment, life in prison, and the death 
penalty. 
 However, recent research challenges the idea of punitive measures that focuses on 
punishing the offender rather than providing rehabilitative treatment and services.  This 
paper examines several studies that show juvenile transfer may not be the most effective 
means of addressing the issues of juvenile delinquency.  Juvenile transfer has been shown 
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to actually increase juvenile recidivism and does not account for the possibility of 
reduced juvenile culpability in terms of considering psychosocial immaturity and 
underdevelopment.  Therefore, juvenile transfer may actually be doing more harm than 
good, and is certainly not achieving the desired goals set forth by the legislatures who 
created transfer laws.  Finally, this paper looks at alternative measures to transfer, 
including Hawaii’s 2014 juvenile justice reform and argues that the United States 
juvenile justice system should return to a more individualized approach that places more 
emphasis on rehabilitation, while still maintaining principles of proportionality and 
punishment for serious offenders. 	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Chapter 1  
History and Evolution of the Juvenile Justice System 
	  
 First, before one is able to explore the topic of juvenile transfer to adult criminal 
court it is important to understand the background history of the juvenile justice system 
and its evolution over the recent decades.  Initially in the early 1800s, juvenile offenders 
were charged and adjudicated in the same justice system as adult criminals, with the 
exception of those under the age of seven who were presumed to be incapable of forming 
and understanding criminal intent.2  Under this justice system juveniles were placed on 
the same level of standards as adult criminals and were subjected to the same penalties 
and punishments.  As a result, offenders as young as the age of seven were incarcerated 
in the same prison as adult offenders and could receive life in prison sentences and the 
death penalty.   
 Then in 1822, the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents released a 
report on the penitentiary system in the United States and deemed it incapable of treating 
juvenile delinquents and addressing their specific needs.3  The organization thus called 
for separate prisons for juvenile offenders that offered a “course of discipline” that 
focused on a mental and moral regimen rather than harsh punishment similar to the adult 
prison system.  Consequently, toward the late 1800s the United States saw a reform 
movement that pushed for the separation of juvenile and adult offenders.  This reform 
movement was partially initiated by the Society for the Prevention of Juvenile 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Lisette Blumhardt, In the Best Interest of the Child: Juvenile Justice or Adult Retribution, 23 Hawaii L. 
Rev. 341, 342 (2000). 
3 Ellie D. Shefi, Waiving Goodbye: Incarcerating Waived Juveniles in Adult Correctional Facilities Will 
Not Reduce Crime, 36 Mich. J.L. Reform 653, 655 (2003).	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Delinquency, which recognized that juveniles and adults are inherently different in terms 
of physical and mental development and maturity.4  Therefore, it saw a need for a justice 
system that was capable of recognizing such differences and providing necessary 
treatment that juvenile offenders needed in order to reduce recidivism and become 
contributing members of society.  As the juvenile justice reform movement gained 
momentum, more reform groups emerged to object the practice of incarcerating juveniles 
with adult offenders and to the “punitive nature of the sentences” given to these young 
offenders.5   
 In response to these calls for reform, several institutions known as “Houses of 
Refuge” were established.  These institutions were privately operated and provided 
housing for delinquent, dependent, neglected, and ungovernable children who were sent 
via court orders.6  By the middle of the nineteenth century, these Houses of Refuge 
provided education, physical exercise, military drills, work, and extensive supervision, as 
well as sobriety, thrift, industry, prudence, and other principles of living.7  These 
institutions were notably the nation’s first attempts at separating juvenile and adult 
offenders by focusing on rehabilitating juvenile offenders rather than punishing them.  
However, these private institutions came under fire when reports of abuse, cruelty, and 
injustice surfaced.  Consequently, reform organizations came together once again in order 
to advocate for the states to take over these Houses of Refuge and to provide juveniles 
with more productive and efficient treatment facilities. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Blumhardt, at 342. 
5 Shefi, at 654. 
6 Ibid, at 655. 
7 Ibid. 
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 The second step in separating juvenile and adult offenders was to create separate 
court systems that recognized the developmental differences between children and adults.  
The first juvenile court was established in 1899 in the state of Illinois through the passage 
of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899.  Under this act, a delinquent child was defined 
as a child under the age of sixteen who violates any law, whether state or local.8  
Moreover, the Illinois Juvenile Court Act gave the courts broad powers to deal with 
delinquents and dependent children.9  The juvenile justice system adopted the principle of 
parens patriae, where “the state, through its courts, had the inherent power and duty to 
provide protection to children by focusing on the child’s welfare.”10  As a result, the 
juvenile justice system moved away from a retributive system of punishment and towards 
a more rehabilitative system that provided juveniles with treatment in order to address 
their delinquent habits.  By 1925, every state had established juvenile courts.11  
 According to Ralph Rossum, leaders of the juvenile court movement viewed 
delinquency as a disease.12  Therefore, the juvenile justice system was intended to treat 
delinquency in the similar way that pediatric medicine treats other ailments in children.  
For example, when a child becomes physically ill, they are first diagnosed and then 
individually treated by medical professionals according to their particular needs and what 
is considered in their best interests.  Sometimes treatment entails that the child be 
separated from society so as to not spread the disease if it is deemed contagious or to 
assure the success of the prescribed treatment.  Also, medical personnel are given 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid.	  
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ralph A. Rossum, Holding Juveniles Accountable: Reforming America’s “Juvenile Injustice System, 22 
Pepp. L. Rev. 907, 908 (1995). 
	   	   	  7	  
maximum discretion to treat their patients according to the patient’s best interests.  More 
importantly, these children are not punished or stigmatized for their unfortunate illness.13  
So in similar fashion, the juvenile justice system was developed to diagnose the “nature 
and cause of the juvenile’s disease of delinquency and recommend to the juvenile court 
judge, who operates as a physician of sorts, a treatment to address the juvenile’s needs.”14  
Such treatment may require institutionalization and separation from society “not as 
punishment but to ensure the successful treatment of delinquency and to prevent the 
spread of the disease to others.”15  Judges assumed the role of physicians in diagnosing 
the cause of a juvenile’s delinquent behavior and were given maximum discretion in 
deciding how to treat a juvenile.  Most importantly, juvenile delinquents were not 
punished or stigmatized as criminals for their misdeeds.  Reformers of the juvenile justice 
system understood that children are the next generation to enter the workforce and would 
be faced with serious obstacles in obtaining a job if the public stigmatized them.  
Therefore, the main purpose of the juvenile justice system was rehabilitation, not 
retribution.  The courts primarily focused on the offender based on his/her specific needs 
rather than the committed offense. 
 In order to mirror this main goal of rehabilitation, and in order to avoid negatively 
stigmatizing juvenile offenders, the court focused on the child’s character, psychology, 
and home environment and adjusted treatment according to a juvenile’s specific 
circumstances.16  In doing so, the juvenile court recognized that each juvenile delinquent 
came from different backgrounds, family structures, and environments.  Therefore, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid.	  
16 Ibid at 909. 
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cause of delinquent behavior varies from child to child and there cannot be one definitive 
plan of treatment to address the individual needs of each offender.  Additionally, the 
court developed a specialized vocabulary that replaced stigmatizing terms; for example, 
“petition” replaced “criminal complaint,” “hearings” replaced “trials,” “adjudication” 
replaced “judgments of guilt,” and “disposition” replaced “sentence.”  Also, unlike adult 
court hearings, the public was excluded from juvenile hearings in order to protect 
confidentiality and to shield the juvenile from the public stigma of criminal 
prosecutions.17  Finally, the juvenile justice system departed from the adult justice system 
in that juvenile court judges were given broad discretion to adjudicate delinquency and 
set dispositions for a flexible individualized system of treatment to rehabilitate offenders 
rather than punish them.  However, this system was rather informal compared to the adult 
justice system and did not guarantee any due process rights to the offender. 
 The 1950s saw “disillusionment” with the juvenile justice system and the 
rehabilitative movement.18  It was becoming apparent that the rehabilitative model was 
not having the desired effectiveness and it was evident that the due process rights of 
juveniles were being heavily violated.  Beginning in the 1960s, the United States 
Supreme Court decided several cases that addressed the lack of due process rights in the 
juvenile justice system.  First, in Kent v. United States (1966) a sixteen-year-old boy was 
convicted as an adult in criminal court for burglary, robbery, and rape.  The juvenile court 
waived jurisdiction without conducting a “full investigation” as required by the Juvenile 
Court Act and the juvenile was tried in District Court, where he was convicted of six 
counts of housebreaking and robbery, but acquitted on two rape counts by reason of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ibid.	  	  
18 Ibid. 
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insanity.19  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed.  However, 
in a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeal’s 
decision and declared that the juvenile court’s waiver to District Court was invalid 
because the juvenile was not given a hearing, access to counsel, or access to his juvenile 
record prior to his waiver.  According to the U.S. Supreme Court, juvenile courts do have 
significant discretion in deciding whether a juvenile should be waived to adult criminal 
court.  However, the Supreme Court also states, “The statute does not permit the Juvenile 
Court to determine, in isolation and without the participation or any representation of the 
child, the "critically important" question whether a child will be deprived of the special 
protections and provisions of the Juvenile Court Act.”20  As a result, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Kent “created a due process-like framework for courts to consider when 
waiving a juvenile’s jurisdiction and allowing transfer.”21 
 Secondly, in In re Gault a fifteen-year-old boy was adjudicated in juvenile court 
and committed to a State Industrial School for making lewd phone calls.22  The appellant 
brought a habeas corpus action to state court in order to challenge the constitutionality of 
the Arizona Juvenile Code and argued that the procedure used in Gault’s case did not 
provide him with the proper due process rights.  The State Supreme Court recognized that 
Arizona’s Juvenile Code does guarantee due process rights in juvenile proceedings but 
the procedure in Gault’s case did not violate those rights.  In an 8-1 decision, the United 
States Supreme Court reversed the State Supreme Court’s decision and declared that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 "Kent v. United States." Legal Information Institute. Cornell University Law School. Web. 26 Oct. 2014. 
20 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 553 (1966). 
21 Enrico Pagnanelli, Children as Adults: The Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Courts and the Potential 
Impact of Roper v. Simmons. 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 175, 176 (2007).	  
22 “In re Gault.” Legal Information Institute. Cornell University Law School. Web. 26 Oct. 2014. 
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juvenile court did not provide the juvenile with due process rights thereby violating the 
Fourteenth Amendment.23  The juvenile was not given adequate written notice informing 
him of the specific issue, the juvenile and his mother did not properly relinquish their 
right to counsel, and the juvenile’s admission did not measure up to the standards 
protecting his right from self-incrimination.24  As a result, the Supreme Court’s decision 
extended constitutional due process rights to accused juveniles, including representation 
by counsel, notice of charges, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, 
protection against self-incrimination, protection from double jeopardy, proof of 
delinquency charges beyond a reasonable doubt, and the guarantee of a hearing before 
judicial waiver to criminal court.25 
 The third case that addresses juvenile due process rights is In re Winship, in 
which a twelve year old boy was adjudicated as a juvenile for breaking into a woman’s 
locker and stealing money from her pocketbook.  The juvenile court relied on the New 
York Family Court Act, “which provided that determinations of juvenile's guilt be based 
on a preponderance of the evidence,” and found the boy guilty even though the court 
admitted that the evidence did not establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”26  In a 
5-3 vote, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the juvenile courts must provide 
juvenile offenders the due process right of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
before being convicted of criminal charges.27  Therefore, the Supreme Court guarantees 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 “In re Gault.” The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. Web. 26 Oct. 2014. 
<http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1966/1966_116>. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Pagnanelli, at 176.	  
26 “In re Winship.” The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. Web. 23 October 2014. 
<http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1969/1969_778>. 
27 Ibid. 
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juvenile offenders with the same due process rights given to adult offenders in criminal 
court. 
 These three Supreme Court cases precipitated a major shift in the ideology and 
structure of the juvenile court system.  According to Enrico Pagnanelli, the “judicial and 
legislative bent became not how to treat children differently from adults, but how to treat 
them the same.”28   Consequently, by treating juvenile offenders the same as adult 
offenders the juvenile justice system began to move away from a rehabilitative objective 
and towards a system more reflective of the adult criminal system of punishment and 
retribution.  Interestingly, the juvenile justice system adopted the very ideology that they 
initially were so adamant in rejecting because early juvenile justice officials did not want 
to place juvenile delinquents on the same level of standards as adult criminal offenders.  
In recognizing that juveniles and adults were different, the juvenile justice system 
believed that juvenile delinquents could be treated and saved from a life of criminal 
behavior.  However, this shift from rehabilitation to retribution recognized that juveniles 
could be held responsible for their criminal behavior because “they had sufficient 
maturity to be culpable,” even though they still deserved less punishment due to their 
underdevelopment, impulsiveness, and lack of self control.29  As a result, these court 
decisions paved the way for a reconceptualization of the juvenile justice system that 
subjects juveniles to harsher penalties similar to that of the adult justice system. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Pagnanelli, at 176. 
29 Blumhardt, at 344.	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Chapter 2  
Moving Toward Juvenile Transfer to Adult Court 
  
 The 1980s saw a huge shift in the perception of the juvenile justice system and its 
ideology.  Up until this point the juvenile justice system focused on the rehabilitation of 
juvenile offenders with the goal of treating the cause of delinquency and reducing 
recidivism in order to produce effective contributing members of society.  Rather than 
punishing offenders for particular crimes, the juvenile court sought to focus on the 
individual and his/her specific needs in order to treat the source of their delinquent 
behavior.  Ultimately, the juvenile justice system was very protective of its juvenile 
offenders and did not want to stigmatize or negatively label individuals.  Under the 
parens patriae philosophy the state aimed at nurturing juvenile offenders and treating 
their delinquent “illness.”  However, increased juvenile crime rates from the 1980s and 
1990s indicated that the juvenile justice system wasn’t achieving its desired goals.   
 Between the 1960s and 1970s the United States saw a huge increase in crime rates.  
According to James Alan Fox’s report to the United States Attorney General on current 
and future rates of juvenile offenders from 1990 to 1994, criminologists predicted this 
wave of increased crime because of shifts in America’s demographics; during this time 
the post-World War II baby boomers reached late adolescence and early adulthood, an 
age at which aggressive behavior and tendencies are at their strongest.30  As this group of 
baby boomers reached adulthood during the 1980s, taking on new job and family 
responsibilities, criminologist predicted that crime rates would decrease.  Moreover, the 
population of juveniles, the age group that was most prone to violent and aggressive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 James Alan Fox, “Trends in Juvenile Violence,” Northeastern University, March 1996, 3. 
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behavior, would be decreasing, which in turn would decrease juvenile crime rates.  Just 
as criminologists predicted the crime rate in the United States decreased from 1980 till 
about 1985.31  However, an unexpected increase of crime occurred in 1986 and the “rate 
of crime began to surge, despite continued shrinkage within the most crime prone 
population.”32 
 Interestingly, crime reports in the 1990s indicated a decrease in violent crime 
rates in cities across the United States.  According to Fox, the overall rate of murder 
declined slightly by 4%.33  Furthermore, adult murder rates from ages twenty-five and 
older decreased 18%, and murder rates from ages eighteen to twenty-four rose a mere 
2%.34  However, the rate of murder committed by juveniles age fourteen to seventeen 
increased by 22%.35  Fox’s report revealed that the juvenile violent crime rate was rising 
even though the adult criminal rate was showing stability and slight levels of decrease.  It 
was becoming more and more evident that the juvenile justice system was not effective 
enough to address the source of the delinquency problem.  Rather than decreasing 
juvenile violent crime rates, violent crime rates were rising. 
 According to another statistics summary by the National Center for Juvenile 
Justice, the years between 1988 and 1991 saw a 38% increase in the rate of juvenile 
arrests for overall violent crimes after more than a decade of stable crime rates.36  This 
increase jump over such a short period of time signified a violent crime arrest rate far 
above any other year since the mid-1960s in which the earliest comparable statistics are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ibid.	  
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid, at 2. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Howard N. Snyder & Melissa Sickmund, “Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A Focus on Violence,” 
National Center for Juvenile Justice, May 1995, 6. 
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available.37  Moreover, the statistical summary indicated that in 1991 juveniles were 
responsible for 19% of all violent crime reported in the United States for which there was 
a single offender, and 17% of all serious violent crimes were committed by juveniles 
only.38  Notably, the report indicated that one in seven serious violent crimes involved 
juveniles in groups, and 14% of all juvenile victims reported that they were victimized by 
a group of juvenile offenders rather than a single offender.39  Overall, National Center for 
Juvenile Justice found that 25% of all serious violent crime involved a juvenile 
offender.40  In 1992, juveniles were responsible for 9% of all murders, 12% of aggravated 
assaults, and 14% of forcible rapes.41 
 In looking specifically at juvenile arrests, law enforcement agencies made almost 
2.3 million arrests in 1992.  About 6% of all juvenile arrests were for violent crimes, and 
about half of those violent crime arrests involved juveniles below the age of 16.42  In 
addition, crime rates increased substantially in every racial group.  Between 1983 and 
1992, the white arrest rate increased 82% compared to blacks at 43%.43  However, there 
still remained a large gap between white and black violent crime arrest rates, where the 
violent crime arrest rate for black juvenile offenders were nearly seven times the violent 
arrest rate for white juvenile offenders.44  Additionally, the violent crime arrest rate for 
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youth of other minority races increased 42%, almost similar to the increase in the black 
violent arrest rate.45 
 Furthermore, the National Center for Juvenile Justice predicted that if violent 
crime arrest rates of 1992 were to continue to the year 2010 then the number of violent 
juvenile crime arrests was projected to increase another 22% in correspondence to the 
projected population growth in the juvenile population ages of 10 to 17.46  Consequently, 
in 1992 the National Center for Juvenile Justice predicted that the number of juvenile 
violent crime arrests would doubled by 2010, where the number of arrests for murder was 
expected to increase 145% over the 1992 level.47 
 These statistical reports inevitably sparked great concern amongst the general 
public and legislative officials.  It was becoming more and more apparent that the current 
juvenile justice system was not having the desired effect in reducing juvenile crime and 
recidivism.  Juvenile arrests rates and violent crime rates were increasing significantly 
and were projected on a dangerous path of increase into the upcoming millennium.  
Moreover, during this period the media began highly publicizing violent acts of crime 
committed by juveniles, further increasing public concern that the juvenile justice system 
was drastically failing.  For example, in 1997 sixteen-year-old Luke Woodham made 
national news when he murdered his mother at home and then went to his high school 
where he murdered his ex-girlfriend, another student, and wounded seven others.  
Woodham was tried and convicted in circuit court and was sentenced to life in prison for 
the murder of his mother.  In a second trial, Woodham was sentenced to two consecutive 	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life sentences for the deaths of the two girls and seven twenty-year sentences for the 
aggravated assault convictions.  This horrific example of juveniles committing heinous 
violent acts of crime is just one of the numerous other violent acts committed by 
juveniles.  Moreover, these highly publicized violent crimes opened the eyes of the public 
and stimulated growing concern about public safety and the juvenile justice system’s 
inability to control the increasing juvenile crime rate.   
 It was becoming apparent that the general public was losing faith in the juvenile 
justice system.  In a 1989 Yankelovich Clancy Shulman Poll, respondents were asked to 
identify those factors that they believed were chiefly to blame for teenage violence.  
Seventy percent of respondents mentioned “lenient treatment of juvenile offenders by the 
courts;” and when respondents were asked what actions they favored to reduce teenage 
violence, 79% said “tougher criminal penalties for juvenile offenders.”48  Similarly, in a 
1996 Gallup Poll, 72% of respondents stated that criminal justice programs that treated 
juveniles differently than adults who committed the same crime were unsuccessful.49  
Additionally, a 1994 Los Angeles Times Poll revealed that 68% of respondents believed 
that juveniles who commit violent acts of crime should be treated the same as their adult 
counterparts, where only 13% believed that these juvenile offenders should receive more 
lenient treatment.50 
 These national polls reveal that the public’s perception of the juvenile justice 
system was deteriorating quickly and that the public did not believe that juvenile courts 
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were doing enough in preventing future violent acts of crime.  Many believed that the 
juvenile justice system was too lenient on juveniles who obviously had the capacity to 
commit violent crimes just as heinous as a full grown adult.  Therefore, the public 
believed that juvenile sentencing was not forceful enough in reducing recidivism of 
current juvenile offenders, and it was also not effective as acting as a deterrent in 
preventing violent crimes of other juveniles.  Many people believed the increase in 
juvenile violent crime rates indicated that juveniles did not feel constrained by the current 
punishment of the juvenile court.  Public perception further revealed divergence from the 
initial rehabilitative ideology of the juvenile justice system and towards a more punitive 
ideology similar to the adult criminal justice system.  As a result, the public called for 
harsher penalties and a focus on the particular crimes committed rather than focusing on 
the individual offender. 
 Furthermore, aside from the growing public support for harsher juvenile 
sentencing and penalties, a group called “crime control conservatives” also pushed for a 
juvenile justice system that more closely mirrored that of the adult justice system.  
Thomas and Bilchik describe the core position of these crime control conservatives: 
 At the core of their position is a belief that substantial numbers of juvenile 
 offenders, especially those who are approaching adulthood, who have significant 
 records of prior delinquency, and/or whose presenting offenses involve serious 
 felonies, are “precocious criminals.”51   
Crime control conservatives thus advanced the belief that such serious juvenile offenders 
should be removed from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and prosecuted as adults. 	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These conservative critics believed that the juvenile court’s focus on the individual 
offender rather than his offense was “thwarting the effectiveness of the criminal law and 
undermining the moral structure of society.”52  Moreover, crime control conservatives 
believe that the rehabilitative ideology was illogical because it incorrectly assumed that 
the juvenile offender had the “illness” of delinquency and thus could be treated, when 
instead they should be viewed as free-willed rational actors that are capable of assuming 
responsibility for their crimes.53  Crime control conservatives mirrored the public 
perception of the juvenile justice system in that they believed juvenile offenders who 
commited violent crimes should be treated the same as adults.  Affording juveniles 
leniency in sentencing only shows that they can get away with serious crimes just 
because of their age. 
 Ralph Rossum offers a similar argument in “Juvenile Justice Professionals: 
Opponents to Reform,” in which he criticizes the rehabilitative treatment model of the 
juvenile justice system as “unjustifiably lenient.”54  Rossum states: 
 This is so because the treatment model prohibits juvenile courts from linking the 
 seriousness of the offense to the subsequent treatment they prescribe.  In juvenile 
 court, a juvenile who commits murder is not charged with, found guilty of, or 
 punished for murder rather, he is simply adjudicated delinquent and treated in 
 such a way as to cure his disease of delinquency.  His murderous conduct is a 
 symptom of his disease of delinquency and of his need for individually tailored 
 treatment to cure him of that disease.  So, too, for a juvenile who shoplifts; his 	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 misdeed establishes him as a delinquent - no more and no less than the one who 
 murders - and shows him to be equally in need of individualized treatment to cure 
 his disease.55 
Unfortunately, as a result of individualized treatment, the juvenile court obscures any 
relationship between an act and its consequences and the juvenile offender is “neither 
forced to confront the consequences of what he has done to others nor made to 
understand that what is being done to him is a consequence of his criminal offense.”56  
Therefore, the juvenile justice system does not effectively allow juveniles to understand 
the extent of the seriousness of their crimes and does not encourage future self-control in 
avoiding future acts of crime.  Furthermore, juvenile courts fail to deter other juveniles 
from committing similar acts of crime because the courts characterize dispositions as 
treatment rather than punishment, and closed hearings prevent the threat of punishment 
from being communicated to other potential juvenile offenders.57  As a result, current 
juvenile offenders are not able to serve as examples to other juveniles in showing the 
consequences of criminal behavior. 
 Secondly, Rossum argues that the treatment model is a great form of injustice in 
the juvenile justice system because it violates the principle of equality, which states like 
cases should be treated alike, and also the principle of proportionality, which states that 
the severity of the punishment should be proportionate to the severity of the offense.58  
Juvenile court judges are given considerable discretion in determining the proper 
treatment for each individual offender in order to treat his/her delinquency, and in making 	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such determinations a judge may weigh different factors such as the home and 
neighborhood environment.  Consequently, heavy judicial discretion leads to disparate 
and unequal results amongst white and black offenders.59  For example, juvenile court 
judges often impose dispositions of community-based counseling and supervision on 
white juvenile offenders who have committed serious violent crimes but who are 
considered amenable to treatment because they come from intact, stable families living in 
safe neighborhoods.  Meanwhile, black juvenile offenders who commit lesser crimes 
often receive harsher dispositions such as confinement in secure detention facilities 
because they are deemed incorrigible and unamenable to treatment since they come from 
single-parent families or impoverished neighborhoods.60  This shows that the juvenile 
court’s focus on the individual rather than the seriousness of the offense leads to equality 
and proportionate injustices. 
 Crime control conservatives were not the only ones rejecting the rehabilitative 
goals of the juvenile justice system, many liberals were “disenchanted with the concept of 
rehabilitation and treatment of offenders” as well.61  Liberal critics argued that juvenile 
court judges abused the great discretion that they were given, thus leading to inconsistent 
judgments and unequal treatment of juvenile offenders.  They suggested that the state 
should stop focusing on forcing juveniles to undergo treatment in order to change their 
delinquent behavior and should instead focus on “insuring that all who came into contact 
with it were treated fairly and equally.”62  Due to the overwhelming opposition to the 
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juvenile court’s leniency and rehabilitative ideology, lawmakers were strongly pressured 
to enact tougher juvenile legislation in order to address the rising juvenile crime rate. 
 As a result, state legislatures began to respond to the heavy criticisms and 
amended state statutes to emphasize punishment alongside rehabilitation in the juvenile 
court’s decision making.63  Washington was the first state to establish sentencing 
standards, mandating presumptive and determinate sentences according to the seriousness 
of the offense.64  In its 1977 Juvenile Justice Act and subsequent amendments, 
Washington shifted the focus of their juvenile courts from rehabilitation towards a more 
punitive system “along the lines of individual responsibility and system accountability.”65  
Washington legislation changed the wording in its juvenile laws to include “making the 
juvenile accountable for his criminal behavior” and to “provide punishment 
commensurate with the age, crime, and criminal history of the juvenile offender.”66  
Other states also followed suit and began to change their legislation to reflect the 
adoption of a more punitive goal.  Some states lowered the minimum age of adult 
criminal court jurisdiction for some offenses and amended the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
corrections system to allow longer confinement sentences.  Texas increased the age at 
which the Texas Youth Commission was required to release an incarcerated juvenile 
from age 18 to age 21.  Ultimately, these legislative changes exemplify the new idea of 
holding juveniles accountable for their offenses and punishing them accordingly.  
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Juveniles would no longer be afforded leniency due to their age, thus completely 
eliminating the principle of parens patriae. 
 Overall, punitive changes in juvenile justice legislation made it easier to transfer 
offenders from juvenile court jurisdiction into the adult criminal justice system.  Juvenile 
transfer to adult court has been an option since the inception of the juvenile justice 
system, and most states had always permitted some use of transfer.67  However, judges 
rarely utilized transfer until the late 1960s.  By 1970 every state allowed some form of 
waiver.68  Transfer rates began to increase significantly; between 1971 and 1981, juvenile 
transfers increased nationally from less than 1% to slightly more than 5% of juvenile 
arrests, a 400% increase.69  
 There are three methods of transferring a juvenile to adult court: prosecutorial 
waiver, judicial waiver, and legislative waiver (also known as statutory exclusion).  
Prosecutorial waiver provides the district attorney the individual discretionary power to 
decide which court to charge the juvenile offender.  By the end of 1997, fifteen states had 
statutes allowing prosecutorial waiver.70  This appears as an attractive option because it is 
a one-step process that bypasses hearing requirements of the typical juvenile transfer.71  
However, prosecutorial waiver is by far the most controversial out of the three methods 
because critics argue that prosecutors are not equipped with the necessary knowledge to 
make such an important decision that will inevitably impact the future of the individual 
offender.  Moreover, the objective of the prosecutor is to obtain convictions; therefore, 	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prosecutorial waiver runs the serious risk of giving too much power and discretion to one 
person, “especially in circumstances where political pressures may outweigh the concern 
for the needs of the juvenile.”72  Moreover, the prosecutor is not necessarily required to 
consider factors set forth in Kent v. United States, and his/her decisions are not subjected 
to appellate review.73  Since prosecutorial waiver is considered the most dangerous, it is 
used the least out of all three waiver methods. 
 Second, judicial waiver provides that the juvenile court judge decide whether a 
juvenile should be charged in juvenile court or transferred to adult court based on a case-
by-case analysis of each offender.  Within judicial waiver there are three subtypes: 
discretionary, presumptive, and mandatory.  Discretionary waiver requires juvenile 
judges to consider the factors laid out in Kent, including age, prior record, previous 
offenses, etc. in making the decision of whether or not to keep the offender in juvenile 
court or to transfer him to adult court.74  Presumptive waiver places the burden on the 
juvenile and his defense counsel in showing the court that the case belongs in juvenile 
court.  If they fail to meet this burden of proof then the judge is obligated to transfer the 
case to adult court.75  Lastly, mandatory waiver specifies that juvenile offenders who 
meet certain criteria, including age and offense type, must be automatically transferred to 
adult court.76 
 Third, legislative waiver excludes from juvenile jurisdiction children of a certain 
age who are charged with certain offenses, usually the most serious offenses or who are 	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repeat offenders.  Consequently, legislatures are given the power to determine when 
juvenile offenders should be transferred to adult court.  According to Lisette Blumhardt, 
legislative waiver is responsible for the greatest number of juvenile transfers but can be 
dangerous because it does not account for factors specific to each individual offender 
such as the offender’s environmental circumstances, potential for rehabilitation, or 
whether it is the offender’s first criminal act.77  However, legislative waiver gained 
popularity in the 1980’s, in which eight states adopted legislative waiver to exclude the 
most serious offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction.  Meanwhile, other states used 
legislative waiver to also exclude repeat offenders from juvenile court jurisdiction.  For 
example, Georgia adopted legislative waiver in order to exclude offenders fifteen years or 
older who had three prior burglary adjudications from the jurisdiction of juvenile court.78  
While legislative transfer has been criticized for not considering individual factors, it has 
also been praised for the same reasoning.  Taking away judicial discretion leads to a 
“rational, non-discretionary, and easily administered method for deciding which youths 
should be prosecuted as adults.”79 
 As juvenile waiver gained increasing popularity throughout the states, state 
legislatures promptly amended their statutes in order to make it easier to transfer 
offenders to adult court.  By 2004, forty-six states had judicial waiver provisions that 
allowed juvenile court judges to waive jurisdiction over juvenile offenders, transferring 
them to adult court.80  Forty-five states gave full discretion to the judge, fifteen states 
gave prosecutors the power and discretion to decide which court to file charges in, and 	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fifteen states enacted mandatory waiver to adult court for certain offenses and 
circumstances.81  Moreover, thirty-four states have some variation of once-an-adult-
always-an-adult, in which juveniles who have been previously transferred and convicted 
in adult court will be automatically transferred for any other subsequent offenses 
regardless of the severity.82 
 The reconstruction of the juvenile justice system signifies a major shift in juvenile 
justice ideology and holds many implications for the futures of juvenile offenders.  First, 
transferring more juveniles to adult criminal court means that these offenders will be 
openly subjected to harsher penalties, including life in prison.  When transfer was first 
implemented, juveniles faced the possibility of the death sentence, until the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled in Roper v. Simmons (2005) that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
prohibited the death penalty for any person under the age of eighteen at the time of 
committing the offense.83  Second, adult court convictions are available to the public and 
can negatively impact a juvenile’s future by hindering his/her chances at employment and 
other economic and social opportunities.  A convicted juvenile will have to go for the rest 
of his/her life labeled as a criminal, which can also have debilitating psychological effects 
on the individual offender, which may cause him/her to genuinely believe that they are 
indeed criminals and will therefore perpetuate criminal behavior.  Third, juvenile transfer 
recognizes that juvenile offenders are culpable and autonomous agents who are capable 
of undergoing criminal trials and being held accountable for their criminal behavior.  As 
a result, juvenile transfer finalizes the shift from rehabilitation to retribution by treating 	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juvenile offenders who commit serious violent crimes the same as an adult offender.  
Under this current juvenile justice system, no longer does the principle of parens patriae 
protect juveniles from the harsh penalties and consequences of the criminal court.	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Chapter 3  
At First Glance: Is Juvenile Transfer Effective?  
 
 Due to the overwhelming public outcry for stricter juvenile justice policies and 
harsher punishments, state legislatures promptly responded by implementing a series of 
“get tough on crime” legislation that expanded the offenses and circumstances in which a 
juvenile can be transferred to adult court, and also enacted harsher sentences for serious 
offenses.  As a result, it became increasingly easier for judges to waive juvenile court 
jurisdiction and have the juvenile transferred to adult court.  The number of judicial 
waivers peaked in 1994 with approximately 13,300 cases transferred, more than double 
the number of judicial waivers in 1984.84  This significant increase signifies the juvenile 
court’s implementation of stricter punishments and the rejection of the court’s initial goal 
of rehabilitation, replacing it with more retributive goals.  Consequently, the juvenile 
court places juvenile offenders on the same level of standards as adult offenders and 
views them as culpable autonomous agents that should be held responsible for their 
crimes.  Furthermore, the dramatic increase of juvenile transfers to adult court raises the 
question of effectiveness and whether enacting harsher punishments really decreases 
juvenile crime rates, specifically violent crime. 
 At first glance it seems as though harsher penalties and stricter treatment of 
juvenile offenders is effective in reducing juvenile delinquency and violent crime rates.  
First, the overall juvenile arrest rate in 2010 was 21% less than the number of arrests in 
2001, indicating a decrease in almost every category of serious offenses.85  Moreover, the 	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number of arrests in 2010 was more than half the number of arrests in 1995, with an 
estimated 1.6 million arrests in 2010 and about 2.7 million arrests in 1995.86  Secondly, 
the violent crime index, which measures the number of arrests per 100,000 juveniles in 
the population, significantly decreased in 2010 in comparison with the violent crime 
index of the 1980s and 1990s.  Between 1987 and 1994 the violent crime index arrest rate 
increased about 70%, raising considerable concern about the nature of the juvenile justice 
system and its effectiveness in addressing juvenile delinquency.  After state legislatures 
implemented their “get tough on crime” policies and made it easier for juveniles to be 
transferred to adult court the violent crime index rate experienced a dramatic drop.  
Between 1994 and 2010, the violent crime index rate decreased 55%, which was the 
lowest rate since at least 1980.87  As a result, the number of juvenile violent crime arrests 
in 2010 was less than any other year in 30 years.   
 Furthermore, all four offenses (murder and negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, 
robbery, and aggravated assault) that make up the violent crime index decreased in their 
arrest rates.  First, the murder rate increased sharply between the mid-1980s and peaked 
in 1993.  However, that rate decreased significantly through the 2000s and remained 
relatively stable.  Although the number of juvenile arrests for murder increased each year 
between 2005 and 2007, that rate declined 24% in 2010, indicating the lowest level of 
murder in three decades.88  The number of juvenile murder arrests in the short 4-year 
period between 1992 through 1995 exceeded the total number of murder arrests from 
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2000 to 2010.89  Second, the number of juvenile arrests for forcible rape in 2010 was less 
than any other year since 1980.90  The juvenile arrest rate for forcible rape peaked in 
1991 with a little more than 22 arrests per 100,000 juveniles ages ten through seventeen, 
and a 50% increase from 1980.91  After 1991, the arrest rate for forcible rape decreased 
through 2010, with an arrest rate that was 62% below the 1991 arrest rate.92  Third, the 
juvenile arrest rate for robbery peaked in 1994 with about 180 arrests per 100,000 
juveniles ages ten through seventeen.  Then that rate decreased 60% through 2002, but 
increased again 43% till 2008.  However, it has decreased again since 2008 by 22% in 
2010.93  Finally, the juvenile arrest rate for aggravated assault also displayed significant 
decreases in 2010, signifying the lowest level since the early 1980s.  The juvenile arrest 
rate for aggravated assault peaked in 1994 with about 280 arrests per 100,000 juveniles 
ages ten to seventeen.  That rate decreased 53% since 1994 in 2010.94  This decrease in 
the aggravated assault arrest rate mirrors the low resting level in the 1980s. 
 Also noteworthy is the overall decrease in the violent crime index (the amount of 
arrests per 100,000 juveniles in the population) of all racial groups.  Juvenile violent 
arrest rates peaked between the late 1980s and early 1990s, then declined significantly 
through 2010 for all racial groups including Asian (75%), American Indian (65%), black 
(57%), and white youth (54).95  In regard to murder arrests, the black to white ratio of 
juvenile arrest rates for murder was nearly nine to one in 1993, indicating high murder 
rates among blacks.  However, through 2000 the murder arrest rate for blacks fell sharply 	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so that in 2010 the black to white ratio for murder arrests was six to one.  With forcible 
rape arrests, the rate for blacks decreased by 75% in 2010 from its peak in 1987.96  For 
whites the forcible rape arrest rate decreased 55% in 2010 from its peak in 1991.97  For 
robbery, the juvenile arrest rate decreased in each racial group by more than 50% 
between the mid-1990s and early 2000s.98  Finally, the arrest rate for aggravated assault 
also decreased for all four racial groups, with the 2010 arrest rate displaying the lowest 
levels since the early 1980s.99 
 The dramatic decrease in juvenile arrest rates consequently led to a decrease in 
juvenile transfers.  Since the transfer peak in 1994, the juvenile courts waived about 
6,000 juvenile cases, which is 55% less than in 1994.  Moreover the likelihood of judicial 
waiver declined for all four general offense categories, including person, drug, property, 
and public order offenses.  The peak for judicial waiver for person offenses was in 1994 
with about 2.6% of petitioned cases being judicially waived to adult court.  That rate 
decreased to 1.5% in 2010.100  Judicial waiver for drug offenses peaked in 1991 at 4% of 
petitioned cases being waived to adult court.  In 2010 that rate decreased to less than 
1%.101  Waiver for property offenses peaked in 1994 with over 1% of petitioned cases 
being waived to adult court.  In 2010 that rate fell slightly to about 0.7%.102  Finally, the 
peak of public order waivers was in 1994 with about 0.6% of cases being waived to adult 
court.  That rate fell to about 3% in 2010.103 	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 Evidently, the decrease in juvenile transfers to adult court mirrors the overall 
decrease in juvenile crime rates.  Since there aren’t as many violent crimes being 
committed, there are fewer reasons for judges to waive jurisdiction over juvenile 
offenders.  Looking strictly at juvenile arrest rate statistics it would appear as though 
stricter penalties for serious offenses deter potential juvenile offenders from committing 
serious crimes.  Since state legislatures have changed their statutes regarding the juvenile 
justice system, overall delinquency rates have decreased, especially violent offense rates. 
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Chapter 4  
Effects of Juvenile Transfer on Recidivism 
 
 Although the overall juvenile crime rates were in decline entering the early 2000s, 
critics of juvenile transfer challenged whether the decrease was really due to stricter 
punishments and a greater willingness by juvenile judges to transfer juveniles to adult 
court.  Critics raised questions of the effectiveness of juvenile transfer and whether it was 
actually achieving the overarching goal of the juvenile justice system, which was to 
reduce crime rates and recidivism.  Contrary to the statistics presented in the previous 
chapter and the appearance of reduced juvenile delinquency, several studies reveal that 
transferring juvenile offenders to adult court is actually doing more harm than good by 
increasing offender recidivism.  Moreover, these studies show that transferred offenders 
are more likely to re-offend quicker, be incarcerated longer, and are more likely to 
commit serious crimes than juveniles who are retained in juvenile court.  As a result, it 
appears as though juvenile transfer is not the most effective solution to the juvenile 
delinquency issue. 
 The first study is a cross-jurisdictional study conducted by Jeffrey Fagan in 1996.  
Fagan examined the deterrent effects of sanction and court jurisdiction on recidivism 
rates in juvenile court versus adult court.104  Fifteen and sixteen year old juveniles who 
were charged with either felony robbery or burglary in juvenile court in New Jersey were 
matched with juvenile offenders in New York, whose cases originated in adult criminal 
court.105  Offenders came from Essex and Passaic counties in northern New Jersey and 
Brooklyn and Queens counties in southeastern New York, which share similar large 	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metropolitan areas as well as similar demographic, social, and cultural characteristics.  
Also, the four counties were found to have similar crime rates and risk factors for 
delinquency.  The four counties were deemed appropriate for comparison because they 
are also interrelated economically, in transportation, media and culture, and in major 
social institutions including universities, financial services, and medical centers.106  
Similar environmental and social structures allow for minimal selection effects and 
provide that the juvenile offenders from the two states are coming from similar 
backgrounds and environments, which creates closer matches between juveniles 
convicted in adult court and juveniles adjudicated in juvenile court.   
 First, Fagan looked at the certainty and severity of sanctions among juveniles in 
adult court in comparison to juveniles in juvenile court.  He found that juveniles 
convicted in criminal court for robbery were more likely to receive sentences of 
incarceration than their matches in juvenile court.  Only 18.3% of juvenile court 
offenders were placed in a training school or residential facility, whereas 46.4% of 
juveniles in criminal court were sentenced to either a state prison, secure youth 
corrections facilities, or local jails.107  Similarly, incarceration rates for burglary 
convictions were higher in criminal court than in juvenile court, where 46.5% of 
juveniles in criminal court were incarcerated while only 23.8% of juvenile court 
defendants were incarcerated.108  Therefore, juveniles convicted in criminal court were 
highly more likely to spend time incarcerated than their matches in juvenile court. 
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 Second, Fagan compared and analyzed the effects of criminal court convictions 
on recidivism compared to those of juvenile court.  Interestingly, Fagan did not find 
significant differences between juveniles who were convicted in criminal court for 
burglary and juveniles who were adjudicated in juvenile court.  Re-arrest rates for 
burglary showed no difference between court jurisdiction, and there was no significant 
differences of the time to first re-arrest between juvenile and criminal court cases.109  
However, there were significant differences for robbery cases in juvenile and criminal 
court.  Juveniles in criminal court were re-incarcerated more often at 56.2%, while 
juveniles in juvenile court had a re-incarceration rate of 40.9%.110  Therefore, robbery 
offenders in criminal court were re-arrested for a new criminal violation over 50% more 
than robbery offenders in juvenile court.111   
 Moreover, juvenile offenders in criminal court were more likely to be re-arrested 
quicker than their juvenile court counterparts.  The average time to first re-arrest for 
juvenile court offenders was 553 days after release.112  On the other hand, juveniles in 
criminal court had a much shorter time to their first re-arrest with an average of 456.5 
days between their first and second arrests after being released from incarceration.113  
Also, Fagan found that juveniles sanctioned in juvenile court had lower hazard of re-
arrest rates than juveniles in criminal court.  According to Fagan, hazard models estimate 
the probability that an individual will fail during a given time period and be re-arrested; 
they simultaneously estimate recidivism based on its prevalence during a given time 
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period, and the interval until re-arrest occurs.114  The hazard of re-arrest for juvenile court 
cases was 29% lower than the hazard for juveniles in criminal court.  Fagan discovered 
that juveniles convicted in criminal court were more likely to be re-arrested for a violent 
offense than juveniles sanctioned in juvenile court.115  So juveniles convicted in adult 
court were not only found to recidivate faster than their juvenile court matches, but they 
were also found to commit more serious and violent crimes than juveniles that were 
retained in juvenile court. 
 The second study that examined the effects of transfer on recidivism was a 
within-jurisdictional study conducted by Donna M. Bishop, et al. in 1996.  Unlike 
Fagan’s cross jurisdictional-study Bishop, et al. compared the recidivism rates of 2,738 
Florida juvenile offenders who were transferred to criminal court to a matched sample of 
offenders who were retained in juvenile court.116  In order to match juvenile court cases 
as closely as possible to criminal court cases, researchers used a matching procedure that 
controlled for seriousness of the transfer offense, number of charges, number of prior 
offenses, severity of prior offenses, and sociodemographic characteristics including age, 
gender, and race.117  Therefore, matches were created in order to ensure equivalency 
among juveniles in the juvenile court and criminal court cohorts. 
 Research findings revealed that the probability of re-arrest among transfer cases 
was greater than among their matched controls across all levels of offense severity.  
Thirty percent of transferred offenders were re-arrested during the follow-up period, 
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whereas only 19% of the non-transfer matches were re-arrested, which shows that 
transferred offenders were significantly more likely to commit additional offenses and be 
re-arrested than the juvenile offenders that were kept in juvenile court.118  Secondly, the 
transfer group was more likely to be incarcerated for longer periods of time with an 
average of 245 days compared to 90 days for the non-transfer group.119  Third, the 
transferred group was more likely to reoffend quicker than the non-transfer group.  For 
those in the transfer group that were re-arrested, the average time to failure was 135 
days.120  The non-transfer group had a significantly longer average time of failure with 
227 days.121  Fourth, researchers found that transferred offenders were more likely to be 
re-arrested for a more severe offense than their non-transfer matches.  Ninety-three 
percent of the transferred matches were re-arrested for a felony offense while 85% of 
non-transfer matches were re-arrested for a felony offense.122  Aside from being more 
likely to commit more serious offenses, transferred juveniles were also less likely to show 
improvement from the severity of their first offense to their second offense.  For the 
transferred cohort, 5% of those who reoffended showed some improvement in that, 
although they were first transferred for a serious felony offense, their second arrest was 
for a less serious misdemeanor offense.123  In comparison, non-transferred offenders 
showed an 11% improvement transitioning from a felony arrest to a subsequent 
misdemeanor offense.124 
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 In addition to these two studies that were conducted in the 1990s, the Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention conducted two follow up studies to examine 
whether the 1990 research results remained consistent in the 2000s.  The first study was 
conducted in 2003 by Fagan and his colleagues as an extended and largely replicated 
study of his previous research in 1996.  This study examined more closely the time-at-
risk recidivism rates for 2,382 fifteen and sixteen year old juvenile offenders charged 
with robbery, burglar, or assault in 1992 or 1993.125  This study also used the same cross-
jurisdictional method by comparing juvenile offenders who were convicted in New York 
with similarly matched juveniles who were retained in juvenile court in New Jersey.  This 
study revealed similar results as the 1996 study in that criminal court cases were found to 
be 100% more likely to be re-arrested for a violent offense and 47% more likely to be re-
arrested for a property offense.126  Additionally, juveniles convicted in criminal court 
were 26% more likely to be reincarcerated.127 
 The second follow-up study was conducted by Lanza-Kaduce and colleagues in 
2005, in which they looked at 950 juvenile offenders, half of which were prosecutorially 
transferred to criminal court and the other half retained in juvenile court.  Similar to the 
1996 Florida study, Lanza-Kaduce, et al. created 475 matched pairs of transferred and 
retained cases that reflected similar characteristics including age, gender, race, number of 
previous juvenile referrals, most serious prior offense, offense, and number of charges in 
order to control for geographical effects and variations in decision making.128  This study 
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specifically focused on recidivism after the age of 18 since “The focus on adult 
recidivism…captures the persistence of a criminal career into adulthood-a pivotal policy 
concern.”129  Research results revealed very similar results as the 1996 Florida study and 
found that transferred offenders were significantly more likely to recidivate than their 
juvenile court matches.  Forty-nine percent of the transferred cohort reoffended, while 
only 35% of the non-transferred offenders reoffended.130  Moreover, this study found that 
violent offenders were particularly more likely to reoffend; for violent offenses, 24% of 
the transferred offenders reoffended compared to 16% of the non-transferred matches.131 
 These four studies present major challenges to the practice of transferring juvenile 
offenders to adult criminal court, and shows that transfer actually does more harm than 
good by increasing recidivism rates and compromising public safety.132  Although overall 
crime rates decreased in the late 1990s and early 2000s, it does not appear as though 
transfer was a contributing factor.  Since the four studies revealed that transferred 
offenders were more likely to recidivate and be re-arrested for subsequent crimes, 
transfer is obviously not an adequate solution to further reducing crime rates.  On the 
contrary, it would seem as though transferring juveniles only set juvenile offenders up for 
a life of crime as they age out of the juvenile justice system and into the adult criminal 
system.  The more a juvenile recidivates, the more likely he/she is to maintain that 
behavior through adulthood.  Therefore, juvenile transfer may bridge the gap between 
juvenile and adult offenders by subjecting juveniles to the same levels of punishment as 
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adults, but it is also evident that transfer does not effectively create a new generation of 
contributing members of society.   
 Furthermore, the goal of protecting the public’s safety is not achieved through 
juvenile transfer because transferred juvenile offenders are more likely to be re-arrested 
for additional offenses and are also more likely to commit violent offenses rather than 
misdemeanors.  As a result, the public’s push for harsher penalties does not actually do 
anything to protect the general public.  On the contrary, it places the general public at a 
greater risk of being victimized, because the more juveniles that are waived to adult court, 
the more likely they are to commit subsequent violent offenses.   
 Moreover, transfer appears to do more harm than good to the individual offenders 
because imposing harsher sentences and incarcerating more juveniles in adult prisons do 
not provide individual offenders with the necessary treatment and services that will 
transform them into contributing members of society rather than reoffending adult 
criminals.  In addition to the Florida follow-up study, Lanza-Kaduce, et al. conducted 
detailed interviews with 144 serious male offenders between ages seventeen and twenty, 
half of whom had been transferred and the other half whom were retained in juvenile 
court.133  Eighty-three percent of the interviewee sample had more than one prior arrest, 
60% committed their first offense before the age of fourteen, and 47% had committed a 
violent offense.134  Interview results found that the youth favored the juvenile facilities 
and programs the most and found them to be the most beneficial because they provided 
offenders with intensive, long-term job skills training and treatment.  Many of the 
transferred youth that were incarcerated in adult jails stated that they expected to remain 	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crime-free because their experiences in the adult facility were so terrible and they did not 
want to return.  However, many youth that were incarcerated in adult prisons indicated 
that their terrible experiences in prison actually worsened their circumstances because 
they “learned more crime while there.”135  Consequently, placing juveniles in adult 
facilities creates hardened criminals that are more likely to maintain a life of crime 
because being surrounded by experienced adult criminals negatively influences the 
juvenile offender and will teach them how to become better criminals rather than 
deterring them committing future offenses.   
 Secondly, incarcerating juveniles in adult facilities is detrimental to the individual 
offender because it does not provide them with the proper treatment and services.  For 
example, many juvenile facilities will provide offenders with psychological treatment and 
counseling, as well as educational and vocational training that prepares juveniles with the 
skills needed to obtain jobs after they are released.  In adult facilities juveniles are not 
provided with the same resources and individualized treatment, so they end up serving 
their sentence time and being released into society no better than when they went in.  
Interviewees did indicate that their horrible experiences in adult prisons will act as a 
deterrent from committing any future offenses.  However, 61% of youth said that prison 
had either no impact or had a negative impact on their behaviors.136 
 Ultimately, these studies and in-depth interviews expose the negative effects of 
juvenile transfer to adult courts.  Instead of protecting the general public from delinquent 
acts and creating the next generation of successful contributing members of society, 
transferring juveniles to adult court only increases the chance that a juvenile will 	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recidivate and commit subsequent crimes.  Moreover, it is detrimental to the individual 
offenders that are incarcerated in adult prisons because they are not provided with the 
necessary services and individualized treatments that juvenile facilities provide.  The 
practice of transfer is actually counterproductive of the intended goals of lawmakers the 
juvenile justice system in addressing delinquency and reducing crime rates.  Therefore, 
legislators and juvenile court reformers need to create more effective alternatives that will 
proportionately punish the offender for their crimes, but still provide services and 
treatment that prevents them from committing subsequent offenses. 
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Chapter 5  
Undermining Juvenile Culpability 
 
 Due to stricter juvenile justice legislation, the age at which a juvenile can be 
transferred to criminal was lowered in some states to as young as fourteen-years-old.  
Also, the expansion of offenses that necessitate transfer allow for more juveniles and also 
younger juveniles to be convicted in criminal court.  As a result, these juvenile offenders 
are held to the same punitive standards as adult offenders and are subjected to the same 
range of possible sentences including capital punishment and life in prison.  
Consequently, a fourteen-year-old child charged with murder will be held to the same 
standards as a 40-year-old adult charged with the same offense, and the two individuals 
can potentially receive the same sentence.  Supporters of juvenile transfer and harsher 
juvenile sentencing argue that juveniles who have the capacity to commit serious crimes 
such as rape and murder are therefore fit to be held to the same standards of culpability as 
adults.  Many supporters believe that if a juvenile is old enough to commit serious and 
violent crimes, then they are old enough to be sentenced just as harshly as adult offenders.  
 However, recent research indicates that juveniles are not as psychosocially 
developed as adults and do not demonstrate the same levels of maturity in their decision-
making processes.  Adolescents are more susceptible to peer pressure and are not able to 
assess long-term consequences of their actions in the same capacity as fully developed 
adults.137  Therefore, it can be argued that juveniles should be viewed as less culpable 
than adult offenders, and should not be subjected to the same types of punishment. 
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 The topic of juvenile culpability has legal pertinence because the Eighth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court has prohibited punishments that are excessive in comparison to the crime 
or compared to the competence of the offender.  For example, in Thompson v. Oklahoma 
(1988) the Supreme Court identified the immature judgment of adolescents in prohibiting 
the execution of juveniles whose offenses occurred before their sixteenth birthday.138  
Justice Stevens declared that imposing the death penalty on juveniles below the age of 
sixteen violates the principle of proportionality; he states,  
 Less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a 
 comparable crime committed by an adult…Inexperience, less intelligence and less 
 education make a teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her 
 conduct while at the same time he or she is more apt to be motivated by mere 
 emotion or peer pressure than is an adult.  The reason that juveniles are not trusted 
 with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their 
 irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.139 
Then in Roper v. Simmons (2005), the U.S. Supreme Court went one step further and 
declared that it was unconstitutional to impose the death penalty for crimes committed 
before the age of eighteen.140  The Court stated that the death penalty is an 
unproportionate punishment for juveniles, thereby violating the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment.  Therefore, if juveniles are to be 
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considered as less culpable than adults, then it follows that juveniles should not be 
transferred to adult court and subjected to the same punishments as adult offenders.   
 In determining criminal culpability there are three categories that factor into 
whether an offender is culpable for an offense. The first category includes endogenous 
impairments or deficiencies in the actor’s decision-making capacity.141  Under this 
category, some individuals with mental illness or mental retardation would be found less 
culpable because they do not have the sufficient decision-making capacity to decipher 
between social and antisocial behavior.  The second category examines the external 
circumstances faced by the actor and determines whether these external circumstances 
are so compelling that a reasonable person might have succumbed to the pressure in the 
same way as the defendant.142  If someone commits a crime in response to situations that 
involve duress, provocation, threatened injury, or extreme need then they are typically 
considered less culpable than someone who commit the same crime under less 
compelling situations.  For example, if someone commits murder in self-defense or 
because he thought that his own safety was endangered, then he may be found less 
culpable for his crime.  The third category includes evidence that the criminal act was out 
of character for the actor and does not reflect regular criminal character.143  For example, 
an individual may receive a reduced sentence if the crime was his first offense, or if the 
actor had a history of steady employment, fulfillment of family obligations, and good 
citizenship.   
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 According to research that focuses solely on adolescent cognitive development, 
adolescents from age fifteen and on are no more likely than adults to suffer from the 
“personal fable,” the belief that one’s behavior is somehow not governed by the same 
rules of nature that apply to everyone else, such as when a cigarette smoker believes that 
he is immune to the negative health effects of smoking.144  Also, research shows that 
adolescents are no less likely than adults to employ rational algorithms in decision-
making processes.  Moreover, it has been shown that adolescents are aware of the risk 
that they take, and increasing their awareness of risk does not significantly impact their 
decision-making processes.  When adolescents choose to take greater risks, it is not a 
result of the adolescent’s incompetence to make rational decisions; rather it is due to the 
adolescent’s concerns in weighing benefits over consequences.145  Therefore, researchers 
have found little evidence from cognitive studies that distinguish the competence of 
adolescent decision-making from that of adults.  As a result, it is argued that juveniles 
can be held just as culpable as adult offenders who commit similar crimes because they 
are just as capable as adults of choosing socially accepted behavior over antisocial 
behavior. 
 However, a study conducted by Elizabeth Cauffman and Laurence Steinberg 
focuses on psychosocial factors rather than cognitive factors by looking at whether there 
are developmental changes during adolescent years in psychological characteristics that 
are relevant to determinations of culpability.146  Through their research, Cauffman and 
Steinberg pose the question of whether adolescents possess the same maturity in their 	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decision making processes as adults, and whether they can be held responsible for their 
criminal actions and decision-making.  By focusing on psychosocial factors Cauffman 
and Steinberg propose a model of maturity of judgment that emphasizes three factors that 
are likely to affect the way individuals make decisions: responsibility, perspective, and 
temperance.147  Responsibility encompasses characteristics of self-reliance, clarity of 
identity, and independence; perspective refers to one’s likelihood of considering 
situations from various viewpoints; and temperance refers to tendencies to limit 
impulsivity and the ability to evaluate situations and consequences before acting.148  
According to Cauffman and Steinberg, these three psychosocial factors affect the 
decision-making processes of each individual, and underdevelopment or psychosocial 
immaturity of adolescents may hinder their abilities to make mature and rational 
decisions like fully developed adults.   
 The study sample 1,015 individuals in eighth, tenth, and twelfth grade, as well as 
college students attending schools in the Philadelphia area.149  The junior high and high 
school students were selected to yield a diverse sample in regard to ethnicity, gender, 
socioeconomic status, and community type (suburban or urban).  The junior high and 
high school students were also selected to similarly mirror the type of college students 
that were studied.  Since the adult sample was drawn from a college population, the 
adolescent group was chosen to similarly reflect a group that would go onto post-
secondary education.  Data was collected through a self-reporting questionnaire in which 
students were asked to rate how likely they were to commit certain acts under certain 	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circumstances.  In order to measure responsibility participants were assessed using the 
personal responsibility scale that specifically examines self-reliance (feelings of internal 
control and the ability to make decisions without extreme reliance on others), identity 
(self-esteem, clarity of the self, and consideration of life goals), and work orientation 
(pride in completely tasks successfully).150  Perspective was measured to examine 
individual’s ability to see short and long term consequences, and how often participants 
take other people’s perspectives into account when making decisions.  Lastly, temperance 
was measured by examining impulse control and self-restraint from aggressive behavior.  
The antisocial decision-making of participants was assessed using the Youth Decision-
Making Questionnaire that presents participants with a set of hypothetical situations that 
involve choosing between socially accepted and antisocial actions.151  For example, 
participants were posed with situations such as “You’re out shopping with some of your 
friends and they decide to take some clothing without paying for it.  You don't think it’s a 
good idea, but they say you should take something too.”  Then participants are asked how 
likely they are to shoplift if they knew there were certain consequences or chances for no 
consequences.152 
 Research results found that antisocial decision-making is in fact affected by age, 
where older adults are more likely to choose socially accepted actions than adolescents in 
the eighth and tenth grade.153  Moreover, research shows that psychosocial maturity 
improves as a function of age, with eighth and tenth grade students displaying the lowest 
levels of maturity out of the entire sampled group.  In looking at whether age and 	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psychosocial maturity affects individual’s decision-making, research results indicate that 
individuals who are more psychosocially mature are less likely to commit antisocial 
actions.  It follows that since adults exhibit higher levels of psychosocial maturity as they 
get older, then older adults are also less likely to engage in anti-social decision-making.  
However, these results do not indicate that all adolescents are psychosocially immature, 
and have insufficient decision-making capabilities.  Cauffman and Steinberg found that 
antisocial decision-making was more strongly influenced by psychosocial maturity than 
by age, which suggests that a 14-year-old child can potentially demonstrate high levels of 
psychosocial maturity comparable to an adult.154  Regardless, it is reasonable to conclude 
that socially responsible decision-making is more common among adults than in 
adolescents. 
 Furthermore, Cauffman and Steinberg discovered that college students under the 
age of twenty-one performed similarly to those over twenty-one suggesting that maturity 
of judgment may stabilize once adolescents are fully developed.155  According to research 
results, the steepest inflection point in the psychosocial developmental curve occurs 
sometime between the ages of sixteen and nineteen.  This indicates that the ages between 
sixteen and nineteen are a crucial period in adolescent development, and in an 
adolescent’s ability to make mature and rational decisions that are comparable to that of 
adults. 
 Cauffman and Steinberg’s results cannot draw a distinct age line at which juvenile 
offenders should be transferred to adult court, and their current research has several 
limitations.  For example, their study relies on hypothetical situations and responses to 	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hypothetical situations are often different from responses to real-world situations.  By 
providing participants with questionnaires of hypothetical situations, researchers create a 
very controlled environment for the participant and does not account for external factors 
that can influence an adolescent’s antisocial decision-making.  For example, the 
circumstances leading up to a typical adolescent criminal offense such as robbing a 
convenience store are characterized by heightened emotional arousal, time pressure, and 
peer influence, all of which are impossible to replicate in a controlled experiment.  
Additionally, research relies on self-report mechanisms, which allow for biases that can 
potentially skew responses toward more socially acceptable responses because the 
participants are aware that their answers are being examined by researchers.  Therefore, 
their answers to the hypothetical situations may not accurately reflect the actions that 
they would really take in real life. 
 Although current research cannot identify a specific age line at which juveniles 
should be found equally as culpable as adults and transferred to adult court, it does 
provide significant insight into the debate about transfer.  First it supports the argument 
that juveniles should not be transferred to adult court and subjected to adult court 
punishments because they are not as culpable as adult offenders.  According to the first 
category of determining criminal culpability, deficiencies in an actor’s decision-making 
abilities are sufficient grounds to reduce culpability for a crime.  Since adolescents are 
still undergoing crucial psychosocial development they do not have the full capacity to 
make mature and rational decisions like fully-grown adults.  Therefore, juvenile 
offenders should not be held as culpable as adult offenders.  Moreover, this is not to say 
that juveniles should be found completely free of criminal culpability, or that juveniles 
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cannot understand the immediate harmful consequences of his/her decisions, as may be 
the case for individuals with mental disorders.  Juveniles should still be held accountable 
for their crimes, but the sanctions should less severe than adult sanctions.  Therefore, 
greater effort should be made by judges to keep juveniles offenders in the juvenile justice 
system rather than transferring them to adult court because the juvenile court can provide 
sanctions that are appropriate and proportionate to the culpability of the offender.   
 Secondly, since many juvenile offenders are still undergoing psychosocial 
development it is arguable that their delinquent behavior is not an accurate reflection of 
their true character because their personal identity is still undergoing considerable 
development.156  An individual’s personal identity does not reach full development until 
late adolescence or early adulthood, and the process of identity formation includes 
considerable exploration and experimentation during the adolescent period.  As a result, 
many children exhibit risky, illegal, or dangerous behavior such as alcohol and drug use, 
unprotected sex, and antisocial behavior.157  However, it is often the case that these 
adolescents “outgrow” their delinquent tendencies as they reach maturity and their 
personal identity reach full development.  According to Steinberg and Scott, it is 
therefore unfair to make individual character predictions about the development of 
relatively more permanent characteristic traits based on patterns of delinquent behavior 
during the individual’s adolescence.158 
 Based on the assumption that juvenile offenders are still undergoing psychosocial 
and identity development, juveniles should be viewed as less culpable for their criminal 	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actions in comparison to adult offenders.  The third category of distinguishing criminal 
culpability states that mitigation includes evidence that the criminal act was out of 
character for the actor and does not reflect genuine bad character.  Therefore, juvenile 
delinquency is more likely to be caused by a juvenile’s tendency to experiment with risky 
behavior rather than a reflection of their bad character.  When adults commit criminal 
offenses they act on subjectively defined preferences and values, and their choices are 
influenced by their deficient moral character.  On the other hand, juvenile criminal 
behavior is more likely to be shaped by developmental forces that are constitutive to 
adolescence.159  When a juvenile exhibits antisocial behavior it does not necessarily mean 
that he/she will continue their criminal tendencies throughout adulthood, and often times 
it is a temporary stage that most adolescents go through.  It would be unjust to transfer a 
juvenile to criminal court and subject them to adult sentencing when the juvenile may not 
possess the same immoral character as adult criminals.   
 Moreover, since juvenile offenders are still undergoing psychosocial development 
and have not reached full maturity, it is more likely that they can be rehabilitated and 
saved from a career of criminal behavior through their adult life.  When adolescents 
undergo psychological and cognitive development they are considerably more 
impressionable and easily influenced.  It is arguable that juveniles are more receptive to 
the psychological treatment and services provided by the juvenile justice system than 
adults.  So research conducted by Cauffman and Steinberg also suggests that juveniles 
should be held in juvenile court rather than being transferred to adult court.  Naturally, 
juveniles who prove to be impervious to the treatment and services provided by the 	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juvenile justice system ought to be transferred and given more punitive sentences for 
their criminal actions.  Therefore, Cauffman and Steinberg’s study does not argue that 
transfer should be completely abolished, but that it should be reserved for individuals that 
are shown to have reached psychosocial maturity and who’s actions may reflect bad 
character and not just developmental experimentation. 
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Chapter 6  
Evaluating Alternatives to Transfer  
 
 Based on research focused on the effects of juvenile transfer and the psychosocial 
development of adolescents, it is evident that transfer may be causing more harm than 
good by increasing juvenile recidivism rates and not accounting for the 
underdevelopment of adolescent maturity in their decision-making processes.  Initially, 
legislators expanded the offenses that allow juveniles to be transferred to adult court and 
also lowered the age at which one can be transferred in the hopes that more punitive 
sanctions would hold juveniles accountable for serious crimes, while deterring potential 
future offenders from committing crimes.  However, it has been proven that juvenile 
transfer does not achieve these goals; therefore more effective measures must be 
established in order to address the issue of serious juvenile delinquents.   
 Transfer should be reserved for the worst juvenile offenders who undoubtedly 
prove to be unamenable to the treatment and services provided by the juvenile justice 
system.  Moreover, research shows that decisions to transfer a juvenile should be left to 
the discretion of the judge and decided on a case-by-case basis according to the 
individual’s past offender history, the seriousness of the current offense, the level of 
psychosocial maturity exhibited by the individual, and other environmental and personal 
factors.  Ultimately, transferring a juvenile to adult criminal court should be the last 
option that a juvenile court judge considers. 
 In recognizing that juveniles are not the same as adults, and harsher penalties and 
sentences are not as effective as legislators hoped they would be, legal critics and 
reformers are pushing for a return to the old juvenile justice theory of rehabilitation rather 
	   	   	  54	  
than punishment, but in a way that will hold the juvenile accountable for their serious 
criminal behavior.  Consequently, legislators are searching for alternative measures that 
effectively and proportionately punish a juvenile offender without treating them equally 
as adult offenders.  For example, in her article titled “Waiving Goodbye: Incarcerating 
Waived Juveniles in Adult Correctional Facilities Will Not Reduce Crime,” Ellie D. Shefi 
proposes that juvenile justice systems implement a continuum of graduated sanctions in 
which a serious juvenile offender begins with imprisonment in a small, very structured 
maximum-security juvenile facility and then eventually progresses down a decreasing 
spectrum of sanctions such as participation in wilderness camps, residential and non-
residential community programs, intensive supervision and monitoring, as well as the 
imposition of restitution and fines.160  The purpose of such a program would be to 
decrease the amount of juveniles in adult prisons thereby preventing juveniles from being 
exposed to the detrimental environment and effects of incarceration in adult prisons. 
 According to Shefi, the most severe sanction on the continuum should be 
imprisonment in a very small-scale, structured, maximum-security juvenile facility that 
provides comprehensive treatment, educational, vocational, transitional, and aftercare 
services to juvenile offenders.161  Moreover, Shefi argues that these juvenile facilities 
must provide offenders with small self-contained units separated based on age, offense, 
and required treatment services.  Correctional staff should be trained to effectively 
interact with and understand troubled youth.  Additionally, programs provided to 
residents should be structured and intensely supervised while also maintaining a 	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foundation of respect for each resident.  These juvenile facilities would take serious 
juvenile offenders off of public streets while protecting the community from subsequent 
crimes.   
 One example of a maximum-security juvenile facility as proposed by Shefi is the 
Riverbend secure juvenile correctional facility in St. Joseph, Missouri.  Riverbend houses 
thirty-three felony offenders who reside in three open dormitories rather than traditional 
one or two-person prison cells.  Each dormitory forms a treatment group of ten to twelve 
juveniles who not only share the dormitory but also attend academic classes and 
participate in group therapy sessions together.  Riverbend requires that residents attend 
academic instruction year-round in order to obtain their GED or high school diplomas.  
More importantly, Riverbend strongly focuses on treatment and rehabilitation, where 
residents attend ninety-minute group therapy sessions led by highly trained college 
educated youth specialists.  Treatment emphasizes messages of individual responsibility 
and discipline by helping residents explore their personal identities, reflect on their 
family histories, learn to understand emotions, and build skills that help them to 
recognize and avoid antisocial behavior.162   
 Shefi suggests that the next sanction along the continuum include comprehensive 
residential wilderness programs such as the Florida Environmental Institute’s “Last 
Chance Ranch,” which offers waived juveniles with the opportunity to participate in a 
program centered on educational and vocational training as well as farming activities 
instead of being incarcerated in an adult prison.163  The Ranch houses twenty-two male 
juveniles in two dormitories.  The program is divided into several phases in which each 	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juvenile participates in individualized academic educational programs and also tends to 
the animals, crops, land, and ranch facilities.  Youth also participate in community 
service and environmental projects and is able to return to the community with the 
accompaniment of a program staff member in order to find employment, register for 
school, secure housing, and re-establish family relationships.  After successfully 
completing the necessary phases, the youth enters a transitional and aftercare phase in 
which the youth receives frequent visits from a community coordinator who closely 
monitors the youth’s progress and assists him in re-integrating back into the community. 
 These intensive small-scaled juvenile facilities prove to be highly effective in 
treating juveniles and reducing recidivism.  In 1999 and 2000, Missouri’s Department of 
Youth Services reported that only 11% of juveniles who were released from the 
Department of Youth Services’ custody or transferred from a secure residential facility to 
a non-secure community program were either re-arrested or returned to juvenile custody 
within a year.164  Additionally, a Department of Youth Services study of five thousand 
youth discharged from DYS in the 1980s found that only 15% were arrested as adults.165  
Therefore, Riverbend illustrates a successful alternative to juvenile transfer and juvenile 
incarceration in adult facilities.  The Florida Ranch program also yields impressive 
results; from 1997 through 2000 Ranch graduates had a one-year recidivism rate of less 
than 16%.  In 2000 only one out of 21 Ranch graduates were convicted of a new 
offense.166 
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 Shefi states that the next step after secure residential facilities would be residential 
community-based facilities and programs followed by non-residential community-based 
facilities and programs.  Residential community-based facilities would include group 
homes, halfway homes, and inpatient facilities.  Non-residential community-based 
facilities and programs would include community centers, day and evening reporting 
centers, and day treatment centers.  These programs would provide treatment, educational 
and vocational training, counseling, and specialized programs designed to address 
specific issues such as substance abuse, violent behavior, sex offenses, parenting, gang 
activity, and anger management. 
 VisionQuest is an example of a successful comprehensive residential community-
based facility that provides “Independent Living Group Homes” to six to ten juveniles 
each.  Each resident is required to attend school and/or work and must participate in 
household activities and chores.  Also, juveniles are taught basic life skills and learn to 
live cooperatively with other housemates and staff.  Initially, these group homes are 
designed to be under constant supervision but residents gain increasing independence as 
they progress through their treatment programs as long as they are compliant with 
treatment plans.  In regard to non-residential community-based facilities, the Star 
Program in Gladstone, Missouri serves as an exemplary model where juveniles receive 
educational, family, and therapeutic counseling, while also participating in community 
service projects.   
 According to Shefi, the juvenile would step down from community-based 
sanctions and receive intensive supervision and restitution sanctions, while still receiving 
services that assist them in integrating back into the community as contributing members 
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of society.167  Intensive supervision could require electronic monitoring, daily reporting, 
random visits by a probation officer, drug testing, curfew, class attendance, and 
individual, group, or family counseling.  When a juvenile exhibits consistent good 
behavior then the intensity of supervision will decrease, allowing the juvenile more 
freedom and flexibility.  Shefi suggests that restitution be mandated in order for the 
juvenile to compensate their victims for any damage that the juvenile has caused, thereby 
punishing the juvenile and also creating a restorative justice system that mitigates the 
victim’s losses.168 
 Many state juvenile justice systems already implement some sort of intensive 
supervision of their juvenile offenders and require restitution upon adjudication.  
However, the small-scaled, comprehensive, maximum-security juvenile facilities are a 
rarity in many states.  One reason for this, and a major roadblock in Shefi’s proposed 
juvenile reform is that these small juvenile facilities are very expensive to run, require 
highly trained and educated staff, and are limited to only providing services to a very 
small group of juveniles.  Even though these facilities have proved to be highly effective 
in reducing recidivism and providing individual offenders the treatment and services they 
need, it is simply not feasible to duplicate in large states that have a larger juvenile 
offender population such as California, which has one of the highest juvenile violent 
crime rates in the United States.169   
 At the same time, states across the nation are making significant efforts to reform 
their juvenile justice systems in order to revert back to the original rehabilitative theory 	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that recognizes the significant differences between juvenile and adult offenders, and 
treats them according to these differences.  For example, California recently changed 
their juvenile laws regarding parole procedures for juveniles currently serving prison 
sentences in adult prisons.  Beginning on January 1, 2014, Senate Bill 260 requires that 
the California Board of Parole Hearings conduct a youth offender hearing to consider the 
release of juvenile offenders who committed specified crimes prior to being eighteen-
years-old and who were sentenced to an adult prison.170  Bill 260 provides that a person is 
eligible for release on parole during the fifteenth year of incarceration if “the person 
meeting these criteria received a determinate sentence, during the twentieth year if the 
person received a sentence that was less than twenty-five years to life, and during the 
twenty-fifth year if the person received a sentence that was twenty-five years to life in 
prison.”171  This California bill effectively serves to give a second chance to offenders 
who were under the age of eighteen when they committed their particular criminal 
offense.  It also recognizes that juvenile offenders have a significantly decreased 
psychosocial capacity to make rational and mature decisions in comparison to adults that 
may diminish a juvenile offender’s criminal culpability.  Bill 260 states:  
 The bill would require that, in assessing growth and maturity, psychological 
 evaluations and risk assessment instruments, if used by the board, be administered 
 by licensed psychologists employed by the board and take into consideration the 
 diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to that of adults, the hallmark 
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 features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the 
 individual.172   
Ultimately, legislators are recognizing that there is indeed a difference between 
adolescents and adults and should therefore be treated differently when it comes to 
punishment.  Although lawmakers are still concerned with punishing juvenile offenders 
proportionately for their criminal behavior, they aim to do so by a different standard than 
that of adult offenders.  
 Hawaii is another state that recently reformed their juvenile justice laws.  On July 
2, 2014, Governor Neil Abercrombie signed Bill 2490 into law, which aims at reducing 
the number of juveniles committed to the Hawaii Youth Correctional Facility (HYCF) on 
Oahu and provides for investments in community-based alternatives.173  In 2013, the 
average cost of a bed in HYCF was $199,320 and the average length of stay was 188% 
longer in 2013 than in 2004 even though juvenile arrests and commitments in Hawaii 
have decreased 28% from 2002 to 2011, and 41% from 2004 to 2013.174  Moreover, three 
in four released juveniles were re-adjudicated as delinquent or convicted as adults of new 
crimes within three years of release.175  Research also shows that a large portion of 
commitments to HYCF was for non-violent and misdemeanor offenses; in 2013, 61% of 
juveniles committed to HYCF for new offenses were adjudicated for misdemeanors, a 
significant increase from 47% in 2004.176  Furthermore, based on research it was found 
that when less serious juvenile offenders are placed in secure facilities, the risk of 
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recidivism increases, while mental health and substance abuse treatment was found to be 
more effective delivered in a community setting.177 
 Therefore, Bill 2490 creates a plan of re-entry into the community for each 
juvenile committed to HYCF, establishing individualized goals to guide successful 
reentry to the community and identification of and a plan for coordination with agencies 
that can provide or contact for existing programs and services relevant/necessary for 
successful reentry.  Secondly, Bill 2490 creates a new incentivized probation system that 
identifies a series of incentives that a juvenile can receive as a reward for compliance 
with the rules and conditions of his/her probation, completion of benchmarks, or positive 
behavior exceeding expectations, to the discretion of the probation officer.  In addition, 
this new incentivized probation system provides that a juvenile placed on probation will 
be eligible to receive early discharge credits to reduce the length of an individual’s 
probation term.   
 By creating a system of incentives that encourages good behavior and compliance, 
Bill 2490 targets less serious offenders in order to reduce incarceration time for juveniles 
that don’t really pose a threat to public safety and so that HYCF can reserve bed space 
and resources for the worst juvenile offenders.  Although Hawaii’s new juvenile justice 
reform is targeted at less serious juvenile offenders, it is still a good candidate to adopt 
the suggestions posed by Shefi by establishing effective residential and non-residential 
homes and facilities so that serious offenders and repeat offenders can receive intensive 
individualized treatment, educational, vocational, and transitional services in an 
environment that does not make them feel like criminals.  In 2010, Hawaii had a violent 	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crime index of 217 violent crime arrests under the age of eighteen per 100,000 juveniles 
between the age of ten and seventeen, which was slightly below the national average of 
225.178  Hawaii’s violent offender population is significantly smaller than other states; for 
example, in 2010, California had a violent crime index of 304, Florida had a violent 
crime index of 343, and Maryland had a violent crime index of 522.179  Therefore, Hawaii 
could possibly afford to establish a sufficient amount of small-scaled comprehensive 
maximum-security juvenile facilities throughout the islands that provide juveniles with 
small-scaled maximum-security housing accompanied by intensive and comprehensive 
treatment that has been proven to reduce recidivism.   
 Furthermore, in order for Hawaii’s new juvenile justice reform to be successful, 
each island needs to create enough community-based programs in order to meet the needs 
of each juvenile offender.  One of the problems highlighted by Bill 2490 is that there 
aren’t enough community-based services available to juvenile offenders.  The bill states, 
“The legislature further finds that critical services to reduce delinquency, including 
mental health and substance abuse treatment, are not sufficiently resourced or accessible 
to Hawaii’s youth.”180  Hawaii already has several effective programs that serve juvenile 
offenders and their families, but more programs and facilities are needed in order to 
accommodate each individual juvenile offender with efficiency and effectiveness.  Hale 
Kipa’s Hawaii Advocate Program (HAP) is one example of an existing comprehensive 
community-based program that is established on each of the major islands of Hawaii, 
Maui, Oahu, and Kauai.  HAP is based on an intensive, strength-based approach that 	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focuses on the needs of the individual juvenile and his/her family.181  Once a family is 
admitted to HAP then they are assigned a community advocate that assists each family 
identify and maintain relationships with persons and associations within the community 
that can offer beneficial services, including individual and group counseling, 
individualized service plan development, competency development for youth and parents, 
youth and family support, and in-school assistance, among other services.  Although Hale 
Kipa is established statewide more community-based programs such as HAP are needed 
throughout Hawaii in order to ensure the success of Bill 2490 and to service every 
individual that applies for services.   
 Hawaii’s 2014 juvenile justice reform is critical in recognizing that juvenile 
offenders are in a critical stage of life that impacts the formation of their individual 
characters and their decision-making processes.  Young adolescents are extremely 
impressionable and easily influenced; therefore they should be treated with extra care in 
order to prevent future criminal offenses and from developing criminal habits and 
behaviors that persist through adulthood.  Similar to other states that have revised their 
juvenile justice laws, Hawaii’s juvenile justice reform illustrates a change in the ideology 
of juveniles courts; whereas the 1980s and 1990s exhibited a more punitive outlook in 
punishing juvenile offenders, the current juvenile justice system is again embracing a 
more rehabilitative approach similar to the initial philosophy adopted by the first juvenile 
courts. 
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Conclusion 
 
 When state legislators implemented stricter juvenile laws they did so with the 
intent to hold juveniles accountable for their criminal offenses by providing sentences 
that were harsh enough to proportionately punish the offender, while deterring other 
potential offenders from committing similar criminal offenses.  Legislators believed that 
a more punitive approach would show juveniles that they couldn’t commit serious and 
violent offenses without receiving the appropriate consequences alongside it.  Juvenile 
transfer was supposed to serve this legislative purpose of providing harsher sentences to 
juveniles who commit serious crimes in order to deter future acts of crime, and to also 
remove serious offenders from the public streets in order to maintain public safety.  By 
expanding the offenses and lowering the age at which a juvenile can be transferred to 
criminal court, more juveniles were being transferred and charged as an adult, thereby 
receiving harsher penalties and sentences similar to those of an adult offender. 
 However, several studies have shown that juvenile transfer actually does more 
harm than good for both the individual offender and the general public.  It is evident that 
juvenile transfer is counterproductive to the goals set forth by the state legislators by 
actually increasing juvenile offender recidivism and increasing the risk that a juvenile 
commits subsequent violent offenses.  Therefore, the general public is not any safer from 
serious juvenile offenders than before transfer was implemented.  Moreover, transfer is 
debilitating to the individual juvenile offenders who are incarcerated in adult prisons 
because they are exposed to serious adult offenders who then teach them to be hardened 
habitual criminals.  Juveniles are also not able to receive the treatment and services that 
they need in order to meet their individual needs, whether it be psychological treatment 
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or educational and vocational services that enable them to obtain their high school 
diploma or an occupation after being released from incarceration.   
 Secondly, juvenile transfer evidently violates principles of determining criminal 
culpability by not accounting for the psychosocial immaturity and underdevelopment that 
is evident in adolescents.  Research has shown that juveniles have a decreased capacity to 
make mature and socially accepted decisions in comparison to adults.  Therefore, 
juveniles should not be held to the same standards as adults because they are not as 
capable of weighing the consequences of their actions and are more susceptible to 
external factors such as peer pressure.  Transferring a juvenile to adult court also 
automatically marks a juvenile as an adult and does not recognize that juveniles often 
mature out of their delinquent behaviors.  Therefore, juvenile anti-social decision-making 
during adolescence does not indicate permanent bad character that will persist through 
adulthood.  By transferring juveniles and trying them as adults, transfer actually increases 
the likelihood that a juvenile will continue his/her delinquent behavior through adulthood. 
 It should be noted that this paper does not suggest that juvenile transfer be 
completely abolished, but rather that transfer should be reserved as a last resort method 
for the “worst of the worst” juvenile offenders who prove to be unamenable and 
unresponsive to the treatment and services provided in the juvenile justice system.  
Additionally, transfer should be left to the discretion of the juvenile court judge because 
each individual offender’s case is different and the cause of delinquency may vary from 
one individual to another.  Therefore, the decision to transfer a juvenile should be based 
on individualized factors including, but not limited to, the individual’s past offender 
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history, responsiveness to treatment, the seriousness of the current offense, and external 
factors such as family support and neighborhood environment. 
 In order for the juvenile justice system to effectively and efficiently address issues 
of juvenile delinquency it needs to revert back to the original rehabilitative approach that 
places more emphasis on the individual offender, while also considering appropriate and 
proportionate punishment for the juvenile’s committed offense.  Creating more 
community-based facilities prevents juveniles from entering the adult prison system and 
even the juvenile prison system, and provides them with treatment services and 
educational/vocational opportunities that allows them to return to the community as 
contributing members rather than releasing them completely unprepared and unable to 
transition back into the community.  Moreover, creating small-scaled maximum security 
juvenile facilities provide an effective method of incarcerating serious juvenile offenders 
and punishing them, but also does so in an environment that promotes personal growth 
and provides the necessary services that juvenile offenders need.   
 Focusing on the needs of the individual is imperative because adolescence is a 
critical period that will significantly affect the pathway that a juvenile progresses on 
throughout life.  Therefore, the juvenile justice system is a pivotal system of intervention 
that can prevent a juvenile from taking a path that leads to a life of criminal behavior if 
the juvenile justice system can effectively provide services and treatment methods that 
divert juveniles from criminal behavior and onto a path that enables them to become 
successful and effective contributing members of society. 
  
 
	   	   	  67	  
Bibliography 
Bishop, Donna M., Frazier, Charles E., Lanza-Kaduce, Lonn, and Winner, Lawrence. 
 “The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Does it Make a Difference.” Crime 
 and Delinquency 42.2 (1996): 171-191.  
 
Bishop, Donna M., Lanza-Kaduce, Lonn, and Frazier, Charles E. “Juvenile Justice Under 
 Attack: An Analysis of the Causes and Impact of Recent Recidivism.” University 
 of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy 10 (1998): 129-156. LexisNexis. 
 Web. 26 Oct. 2014. 
 
Blumhardt, Lisette. “In the Best Interests of the Child: Juvenile Justice of Adult 
 Retribution.” University of Hawaii Law Review 23 (2000): 341-362. LexisNexis. 
 Web. 26 Oct. 2014. 
 
Bortner, M.A. Inside A Juvenile Court: The Tarnished Ideal of Individualized Justice. 
 New York: New York University Press, 1982.  
 
Cauffman, Elizabeth and Steinberg, Laurence. “(Im)maturity of Judgment in 
 Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults.” Behavioral 
 Sciences and the Law 18 (2000): 741-760. 
 
"Hawaii Advocate Program." Hale Kipa. Web. 27 Nov. 2014. 
 
“Hawaii’s 2014 Juvenile Justice Reform.” The Pew Charitable Trusts. Web. 27 Nov 2014. 
 
"HI HB2490 | 2014 | Regular Session." LegiScan. LegiScan LLC, 08 Jul. 2014. Web. 28 
 Nov. 2014. <http://legiscan.com/HI/bill/HB2490/2014>. 
 
Fagan, Jeffrey. “The Comparative Advantage of Juvenile Versus Criminal Court 
 Sanctions on Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders.” Law and Policy 
 18 (1996): 77-114. 
 
Fritsch, Eric and Hemmens, Craig. “Juvenile Waiver in the United States 1979-1995: A 
 Comparison and Analysis of State Waiver Statutes.” Juvenile and Family Court 
 Journal 46 (1995): 17-35. HeinOnline. Web. 2 Nov. 2014. 
 
In Re Gault. Legal Information Institute. Cornell University Law School. Web. 26 
 Oct. 2014. 
 
In re Gault. The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 26 Oct.2014. 
 <http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1966/1966_116>. 
 
In re Winship. The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 23 October 2014. 
 <http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1969/1969_778>. 
	   	   	  68	  
 
Kent v. United States. 383 U.S. 541. Supreme Court of the U.S. 1966. Supreme Court 
 Collection. 
 
"Kent v. United States." Legal Information Institute. Cornell University Law School. 
 Web. 26 Oct. 2014. 
 
Lanza-Kaduce, Lonn, Frazier, Charles E., and Bishop, Donna M. “Issues in Juvenile 
 Justice: Juvenile Transfers in Florida: The Worst of the Worst.” University of 
 Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy 10 (1999): 277-301. LexisNexis. Web. 
 2 Nov. 2014. 
 
McDowell, Gary L., and Jinney S. Smith, eds. Juvenile Delinquency in the United States 
 and the United Kingdom. New York: St. Martin's, 1999. Print. 
 
Pagnanelli, Enrico. “Children as Adults: The Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Courts and 
 the Potential Impact of Roper v. Simmons.” American Criminal Law Review 44 
 (2007): 175-199. LexisNexis. Web. 26 Oct. 2014. 
 
Puzzanchera, Charles. “Juvenile Arrests 2010.” Office of Juvenile Justice and 
 Delinquency Prevention. December 2013. 
 
Puzzanchera, Charles and Addie, Sean. “Delinquency Cases Waived to Criminal Court, 
 2010.” Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. February 2014. 
 
Redding, Richard E. “Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to Delinquency.” 
 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. June 2010. 
 
Roper v. Simmons. 543 U.S. 551. Supreme Court of the U.S. 2005. Supreme Court 
 Collection 
 
Rossum, Ralph A. “Holding Juveniles Accountable: Reforming America’s ‘Juvenile 
 Injustice System.’” Pepperdine Law Review 22 (1995): 907-923. LexisNexis. 
 Web. 26 Oct. 2014. 
 
Shefi, Ellie D. “Waiving Goodbye: Incarcerating Waived Juveniles in Adult Criminal 
 Facilities Will Not Reduce Crime.” University of Michigan Journal of Law 
 Reform 36 (2003): 653-693. LexisNexis. Web. 26 Oct. 2014. 
 
“Senate Bill 260-Justice for Juveniles With Adult Prison Sentences,” Fair Sentencing for 
 Youth, Web, 27 Nov 2014. 
 
Snyder, Howard N. “Juvenile Arrests 1995.” Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
 Prevention. February 1997. 
 
	   	   	  69	  
Snyder, Howard N. and Sickmund, Melissa. “Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A Focus 
 on Violence.” National Center for Juvenile Justice. May 1995. 
 
Steinberg, Laurence and Scott, Elizabeth S. “Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: 
 Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death 
 Penalty.” American Psychologist 58.12 (2003): 1-10. 
 
Thomas, Charles W. and Bilchik, Shay. “Criminal Law: Prosecuting Juveniles in 
 Criminal Courts: A Legal and Empirical Analysis.” Journal of Criminal Law & 
 Criminology 76 (1985): 439-466. LexisNexis. Web. 2 Nov. 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
